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INTRODUCTION
Five years after the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Geor-
gia's ban on homosexual sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick,' the Court, in
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. ,2 permitted the State of Indiana to prohibit
nude dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend. At first glance
these cases appear to have little in common. The plaintiffs in Bowers
claimed a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to engage in same-sex sodomy, while the
plaintiffs in Barnes claimed a violation of their First Amendment
rights in response to a statute prohibiting nude dancing in a night
club. While both claims rested on independent and ultimately un-
successful constitutional arguments, the regulations challenged in
both instances were strikingly similar: state prohibitions of sexual
conduct. This similarity becomes increasingly apparent in light of
the Supreme Court's recent holding in Lawrence v. Texas.! Specifi-
cally, by articulating why Bowers was decided incorrectly, Lawrence im-
pliedly demonstrates why Barnes was wrong as well.
The ink had barely dried on the Lawrence opinion before public
outcry erupted over its potential reach. Politicians, scholars, com-
munity leaders, and pop-cultural commentators across the political
spectrum all claimed that the opinion would have far reaching impli-
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3 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick by holding state prohibitions of homo-
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cations, for better or for worse, well beyond the holding of the 1986
case it sought to overturn.4 Foreseeing such a response, the Justices
who penned the opinion textually tripped over themselves in a mud-
died attempt to delineate the outer boundaries of Lawrence the ma-
jority carefully, yet ambiguously, couched its discussion of the liberty
interest in limiting terms; Justice O'Connor's concurrence was quick
to distinguish her reasoning from the controversial issue of same-sex
marriage; and Justice Scalia in his vigorous dissent claimed that the
majority's opinion entailed a "massive disruption of the current social
order," opening the doors to the legalization of prostitution, bestial-
ity, incest, and masturbation. 7
Undoubtedly the scope of Lawrence will be the subject of contin-
ued debate and future litigation." However, the ultimate substantive
thrust of the decision will be determined not by a whirlwind of socio-
political rhetoric, but rather by the methodology the courts employ
in their initial applications of the decision. Put another way, it is the
methodology surrounding the initial interpretations of Lawrence--the
courts' mode of analysis and their level of critical engagement-that
will ultimately give effect to the liberty interest which the opinion
See, e.g., Robert P. George, Rick Santorum is Right: Where Will the Court Go After Marriage?,
NAT'L. REV. ONLINE (May 27, 2003) (discussing Senator Rick Santorum's comments that Law-
rence will open the door to polygamy and same-sex marriage), at http://nationalreview.com/
comment/comment-george052703.asp; Rowan Scarborough, "Don't Ask Don't Tell" Faces Chal-
lenge, WASH. TIMES, July 7, 2003, at Al (claiming that exclusion of gays in the military may be
subject to challenge after Lawrence). See generally Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4, 96
(2003) (noting the far-reaching implications of Lawrence).
5 See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (defining and offering detail on the limits
outlined in Lawrence); see also Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and "That" in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
Sup. CT. REv. 75 (drawing attention to the limiting effects of the seemingly deliberate ambiguity
of many of the key passages in the majority opinion).
6 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Unlike the moral disapproval
of same-sex relations-the asserted state interest in this case-other reasons exist to promote
the institution of marriage beyond the moral disapproval of an excluded group.").
7 Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8 Lawrence has already been raised in several unsuccessful attempts to invalidate various
state regulations. See, e.g., Williams v. Att'y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236-38 (11th Cir. 2004) (up-
holding Alabama's prohibition of sex toy sales and declaring that Lawrence contained no fun-
damental guarantee of sexual privacy); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs.,
358 F.3d 804, 815-17 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida's prohibition of adoption by same-sex
partners and dismissing contentions that Lawrence bars such a prohibition); United States v. Pe-
terson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 797, 803 (D.S.C. 2003) (finding that Lawrence does not invalidate prohi-
bitions on child pornography); State v. Clark, 588 S.E.2d 66, 68-69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (reject-
ing the use of Lawrence as a constitutional challenge to a rape statute). But see Goodridge v.
Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003) (relying, in part, on Lawrence to hold
that moral approbation is not a sufficient justification for denying same-sex couples the benefits
of state sanctioned marriage under the Massachusetts Constitution); Anderson v. King County,
No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, at *7 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004) (using Lawrence
as a justification for construing the Washington State Constitution to forbid exclusion of homo-
sexuals from the institution of marriage).
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purports to protect. In the less than two years since the Court an-
nounced its decision in Lawrence, considerable debate and confusion
have arisen over what, if any, fundamental right the majority opinion
announced, and what state action it prohibits beyond the criminaliza-
tion of adult, consensual sodomy.9 Deciphering the equivocal limits
of Lawrence and the permutations of conduct afforded protection is a
challenge that all courts will face in a variety of contexts. However,
while the substantive outcome of each future case unquestionably
contributes to further defining the scope of the protected liberty in-
terest, the very lens through which the courts examine the conduct at
issue has profound implications for the future reach of the decision.
As courts are currently working on an ostensibly blank canvas, it is the
methodology employed in these first judicial rapplings with Lawrence
that will set the tenor of the decision's legacy.
This Comment will argue that when interpreting Lawrence, courts
should employ contemporary understandings of human sexuality in
keeping with the decision's progressive and liberating spirit. Specifi-
cally, the courts should approach all questions of sexual conduct and
sexual expression with a nuanced conception of the experience of
sexuality implicit in modernity. When such an understanding of con-
temporary realities is employed, it becomes readily apparent why
Barnes, like Bowers, was decided incorrectly.
This Comment begins by looking to the Lawrence decision itself,
examining the limits of the opinion and the type of conduct it pur-
ports to protect. Next, the Comment will argue for a broad reading
of protected "sexual conduct," one that reflects a nuanced under-
standing of the modern experience of sexuality. Employing such an
understanding requires the courts to categorically reject the sexual
status quo, insofar as sexual conduct is only understood as such in its
more traditional, universally-accepted manifestations. Specifically,
this Comment will argue that in recognizing forms of sexual conduct
deserving protection under Lawrence, the courts need to inquire into
the myriad of ways sexuality is manifest outside of the recognized
paradigms.
This Comment will ultimately employ the controversial (and often
criticized)" case of Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc. as just one example of
9 See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 815-17 (finding that Lawrence cannot be construed to recognize a
new fundamental right, as the Court did not inquire into whether private sexual conduct was a
fundamental right and did not engage in strict scrutiny); see also Williams, 378 F.3d at 1236-38
(declining to find that Lawrence created a fundamental right to sexual privacy).
1o Lofton, 358 F.3d at 815-17, and Williams, 378 F.3d at 1236-38, are early examples of fed-
eral courts trying to decipher the scope of the broader liberty interest in Lawrence. For the pur-
pose of this Comment, the Eleventh Circuit's determinations will be considered grossly restric-
tive and improper.
i See infra note 66 (citing critical treatment of Barnes).
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how modern understandings of sexuality can be utilized in future in-
terpretations of Lawrence, as well as the implications of doing so for
other areas of constitutional jurisprudence. In particular, the Com-
ment will argue that extending Lawrence-type protection to the con-
duct at issue in Barnes requires that courts embrace an all-
encompassing conception of sexual conduct-one that recognizes
the sexuality inherent in certain non-physical, non-traditional, visual
acts. The failure of courts to adopt such an understanding creates
the risk that Lawrence will become a judicial pronouncement which
simply reifies the pre-Lawrence status quo, rather than one which pro-
tects the liberty of those on the margins.1"
The Comment concludes by demonstrating that approaching fu-
ture interpretations of Lawrence with an expansive conception of sex-
ual conduct provides for a broader, more liberating, range of pro-
tected activity. As a logical extension of such an approach, the
Comment will ultimately argue that regulations of sexual expression
such as those present in Barnes may, after Lawrence, be more effec-
tively understood as "conduct" regulations that serve to regulate
"status," and are therefore subject to due process challenge. It is
only when Lawrence is approached with such an expansive and con-
temporary understanding of sexuality that the ultimate promise of
the decision may be fully realized.
14
I. THE LIMITING LANGUAGE OF LAWRENCE
It is crucial to establish at the outset, for the purpose of future ap-
plication, that Lawrence is not simply a case involving the right of ho-
mosexual individuals to engage in a particular sexual act.15 Lawrence
stands for the much broader proposition that a state's power to regu-
late sexual conduct, in the absence of a non-morality based state in-
12 While there is no explicit discussion of the Court's intent to protect marginalized indi-
viduals, that sentiment is implicit in the Court's declaration that all persons can invoke the
Constitution in their search for greater freedom. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
13 See infra Part I.A.
14 In Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1893 (2004), Lawrence Tribe declares Lawrence's articulation of a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty to be one of the most defining and empowering moments in constitutional jurispru-
dence since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15 See supra note 4 (citing scholarly speculations on the far-reaching implications of Lawrence
beyond the prohibition of regulations prohibiting same sex sodomy). But see Williams, 358 F.3d
at 1236 (finding that Lawrence simply established the "unconstitutionality of criminal prohibi-
tions on consensual adult sodomy"); cf Recent Cases, Constitutional Law--Sustantive Due Proc-
ess-Eleventh Circuit Upholds Alabama Statute Banning Sale of Sex Toys, 118 HARV. L. REV. 802
(2004) (analyzing the claim in Williams and Loion that Lawrence does not articulate a funda-
mental right to sexual privacy).
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terest, is virtually non-existent. 16 Thus, on its face, Lawrence is primar-
ily a decision regarding a state's power to enact a particular conduct
regulation. 7 While this statement should appear obvious (and is,
perhaps, an oversimplification), it is worth articulating for its implica-
tions on the reach of Lawrence in future decisions. If Lawrence can be
read as a conduct-focused opinion, it is readily apparent that the
holding becomes applicable to a broad range of cases, most notably
those like Barnes, which implicate the First Amendment."
A. Freeing Conduct
Prior to Lawrence, the Supreme Court grappled with the distinc-
tion between "conduct" and "status" regulations in several instances
involving homosexuality. Lawrence is particularly noteworthy because
it serves as a clarification of the relationship between these two con-
cepts. Were Lawrence to be read solely as a status-focused decision-
concentrating on the power of the state to punish a class of people
based on who they are ("status") as opposed to what they do ("con-
duct")-its future reach would be significantly truncated.' Despite
the apparent separability of these terms, Lawrence represents the first
time that the Court was able to properly gauge the relationship be-
tween homosexual status and conduct.
The majority in Bowers held that it was permissible for Georgia to
prohibit homosexual sodomy, which the Court treated ostensibly as a
straight-forward conduct regulation. 0  The problem with the Bowers
analysis was that Georgia had not actually criminalized homosexual
sodomy, but rather had enacted a general sodomy prohibition that
16 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (holding that morality alone is not a sufficient state interest to
justify the criminalization of private, adult, consensual sexual conduct).
17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on questions concerning the regulation of "con-
duct." See Lawrence v. Texas, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002) (granting certiorari).
18 It has been argued that sexual conduct may implicate both free speech rights under the
First Amendment as well as fundamental rights/liberty interests under the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments. See C. Edwin Baker, Op-Ed, First Amendment Protection for Gays: Nude Dancing and
Homosexuality Deserve the Same Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at 23 (arguing that as legitimate
forms of expression/conduct, nude dancing and homosexual sodomy deserve the same protec-
tion under the First Amendment). This Comment relies on Professor Baker's initial inquiry,
specifically in its re-evaluation of Barnes.
19 Were Lawrence to apply only to status-based classifications, the holding would only extend
to instances where the law singled out a class of individuals for special treatment. In contrast, a
conduct-based ruling extends to all who engage in the protected activity, independent of "who
they are."
20 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (holding that there is no fundamental right
to engage in same-sex sodomy).
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applied to all citizens of the state." Georgia's statute was, on its face,
simply a regulation of "conduct" independent of "status." The Court,
however, took it upon itself to conflate the two concepts, treating
homosexuals as a class defined by their willingness to engage in cer-
tain conduct-namely, sodomy. Thus, the question the Court even-
tually answered in the negative was whether there is a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy. The question of homosexual
23sodomy, however, should never have been present in the case.
The Court had more success teasing out the status/conduct dis-
tinction in Romer v. Evans2 4 precisely because the Court was faced with
a challenge to a straightforward status regulation, independent of any
conduct prohibitions. In holding an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Federal Constitution, the Court recognized that the amendment in
question was "a status-based classification ... [which is] something
the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.
", 5
Lawrence again presented the Court with a hybrid status/conduct
distinction, yet one more obvious than that in Bowers. The statute at
issue in Lawrence was an explicit prohibition of homosexual sodomy.
6
Thus, the Court was faced with a conduct regulation, but one predi-
cated on status. In this instance, however, the majority was able to
properly articulate the two categories of regulation without conflating
them. The Court acknowledged its error in Bowers stating, "To say
21 See id. at 188 n.1 ("Georgia Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984) provides... (a) A person commits
the offense of Sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs
of one person and the mouth or anus of another.. ").
See id. at 186 (stating the case's holding in terms of homosexual sodomy); see also Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that homosexual conduct "de-
fines the class" as homosexuals); JANET HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S
ANTI-GAY POLICY 5-11 (1999) (arguing that the Bowers majority inappropriately conflated ho-
mosexual status and conduct).
23 This is ultimately the problem that presents itself in the military's "Don't Ask Don't Tell"
policy. Under Department of Defense ("DOD") regulations, service members who demonstrate
a "propensity to engage in homosexual conduct" may be properly subject to discharge. How-
ever, in enforcing the statute, the mistake present in Bowers is repeated such that conduct and
status are again conflated. While the original DOD regulations were intended to be a straight-
forward conduct prohibition, they ostensibly became regulations of status. Homosexuals were
understood to be who they were because of what they did See HALLEY, supra note 22, at 3-5 (de-
scribing the history of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," and arguing that its application cannot distin-
guish between engaging in homosexual conduct and being a homosexual). Several circuit
courts have upheld the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy as constitutional. See, e.g., Able v. United
States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
1997).
24 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding unconstitutional an amendment to the Colorado Constitu-
tion that precluded all state action designed to extend general protections to homosexual per-
sons).
25 Id. at 621.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).
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that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sex-
ual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse."27 The Court went further
to say, "The laws involved in Bowers and here are ... statutes that...
do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and
purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching
upon the most private human conduct .... 8  Sexual conduct, the
Court concluded, does not define a class. It is rather "but one element
in a personal bond" formed by members of that class.' Thus, the
Court properly acknowledged a certain dialectic between status and
conduct: while they are distinct categories, regulation of one may
have profound implications for the other.
B. Limiting Dimensions
With the notion of "conduct" freed from its improper conflation
in Bowers, Lawrence can be correctly read as a ruling on state regula-
tion of sexual conduct.30 As such, its reasoning has tremendous po-
tential for application in all cases dealing with forms of sexual expres-
sion. Critics of Lawrence were quick to make doomsday predictions
that the Court had opened its doors to a proverbial parade of horri-
bles. 3' Had the Court drafted a far more ambiguous and sweeping
opinion, there may have been merit to such ultimately baseless wor-
5 2ries. However, with a certain sense of judicial clairvoyance, the ma-jority was quick to erect an outer wall around the liberty interest pre-
27 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
28 Id.
Id.; see also Ruth E. Sternglantz, Comment, Raining on the Parade of Horribles: Of Slippery
Slopes, Faux Slopes, and Justice Scalia's Dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1116-
20 (2005) (claiming that Lawrence properly untangled the blurring of status and conduct pre-
sent in Bowers).
30 This, of course, is not intended to suggest that status regulation plays no part in the ma-
jority's analysis. However, for the purpose of this section of the Comment, it is necessary to
look at Lawrence's treatment of conduct regulation, without focusing on its status implications.
31 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting the views of those who foresee wide-
ranging consequences in Lawrence's wake); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (claiming that the Lawrence ruling calls into question laws against "bigamy, same-sex mar-
riage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity").
32 While Lawrence was handed down rather recently, the "massive disruption" that Justice
Scalia predicted in his dissent, Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J., dissenting), has not yet oc-
curred. Rather, several laws regulating sexual conduct have since been upheld only when the
state was unable to assert a non-morality based justification. See supra note 9 and accompanying
text (describing the narrow interpretation of Lawrence in subsequent court decisions). The
most monumental use of Lawrence to date was its citation in Goodridge v. Department of Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (finding a Massachusetts ban on same-sex marriage in violation of
the state constitution).
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sent in Lawrence. Deciphering the precise limits of that nebulous
boundary is a challenge all courts will undoubtedly face.
When applying the analysis performed in Lawrence to other cases
concerning state regulation of sexual expression such as Barnes, the
opinion's judicially created boundaries come into focus. The major-
ity opinion contains two main limiting dimensions that protect the
asserted liberty interest from over-expansive interpretation. These
two dimensions will hereinafter be referred to as the opinion's "ex-
pressive limitations" and "spatial limitations."3 3 These limitations are
stated explicitly and impliedly throughout the opinion and are, in
part, derived from Supreme Court precedent. 4 Without the presence
and enforcement of such limitations it would be difficult to imagine a
post-Lawrence exercise of liberty that could be constitutionally subject
to state sanction.
The spatial and expressive limitations were initially made explicit
by the petitioners in their petition for certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted.35 The second of three questions put to the Court was
"[w] hether Petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual
intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment?" 36
The petitioners' framing of the issue articulates the narrowest
possible reading of Lawrence, and the most restrictive interpretation
of the opinion's expressive and spatial limitations. At the absolute
very least, Lawrence speaks to the unconstitutionality of regulating
"adult consensual sexual intimacy" occurring within the confines of the
"home," when the only asserted state interest is grounded in notions of
morality. s' Under this reading, the private sphere of the "home"
33 The specific nomenclature is mine for the express purpose of this Comment. As of yet, I
do not suggest repeating it in learned circles. There is, however, some textual support for my
construction of these terms. "Spatial dimensions" are referenced throughout the opinion. See
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 ("The instant case involves liberty... in its spatial and more transcen-
dent dimensions."). Sexual conduct has also been characterized as a form of "expression." See,
e.g., Baker, supra note 18, at 23 ("[H]omosexual conduct between consenting adults should be
protected expression.").
34 See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (describing the history of the constitutional
protection afforded to intimate, rather than purely sexual matters by the Supreme Court before
Lawrence).
35 537 U.S. 1044 (2002) (granting the petitioners, John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner, cer-
tiorari, on the three questions they submitted to the Court).
Id. (emphasis added).
37 Articulating a discreet and narrow issue for the Court was, quite obviously, sound judicial
strategy on behalf of the petitioners. Citation of the petition for certiorari is not intended to
suggest that the petitioners would advocate for such a restrictive reading of the Court's ultimate
holding.
Cf supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing the confusion over what, if any, fun-
damental right was announced in Lawrence).
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serves as a spatial limitation, and "adult consensual sexual intimacy"
as a limitation on the type of conduct warranting protection.
Fortunately for those who argue that Lawrence should have a more
expansive interpretation, the Court did not cast their ultimate deci-
sion in the explicit terms advanced by the petition for certiorari.
While acknowledging the presence of spatial and expressive limita-
tions, the opinion remained equivocal as to the precise scope of these
limits. The challenge that courts will face in subsequent applications
of Lawrence is giving meaning to these judicially implied limitations.
1. Expressive Limitations
In considering treatment of the expressive limitations in the opin-
ion, "sexual intimacy" stands out as the only equivocal term. The ad-
ditional requirements of "adult" and "consensual" are explicit and
relatively unambiguous. 9 Moreover, the state can assert numerous
interests, independent of morality, in requiring that sexual conduct
remain between consenting adults.4° Intimacy, on the other hand, is
a far more subjective concept, which the state will have more diffi-
culty limiting in the absence of a non-morality based justification.
While the term "intimate" is absent from law dictionaries,' it is given
broad meaning in standard dictionaries.42 Intimate conduct may be
understood broadly as conduct, "personal or private," characterizing
"one's deepest nature" or more narrowly as conduct "marked by a
warm friendship developing through long association."43 When ex-
amining the specific facts of Lawrence, it is clear that the intimacy at
issue is of the more traditional variety. Specifically, the intimate con-
duct involved two individuals, the mutual touching and meeting of
39 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The case does involve two adults who,
with full and mutual consent from each other engaged in sexual practices.. . ."); cf Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) ("Although we have often pointedly recognized the
high importance of the state interest in regulating the exposure of obscene materials to juve-
niles and unconsenting adults, this Court has never declared these to be the only legitimate
state interests permitting regulation .... " (citations omitted)).
40 One such state interest is that of protecting minors. But see Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at
106 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that there is an "emerging view that the state interests in
protecting children and in protecting unconsenting adults may stand on a different footing
from the other asserted state interests").
41 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 827 (7th ed. 1999).
42 See, e.g., THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DIcTIONARY (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter MERRIAM-
WEBSTER] (defining "intimate" as: "of a very personal or private nature;" "belonging to or char-
acterizing one's deepest nature;" "marked by very close association, contact, or familiarity";




JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
bodies, and the act of penetration." One of the questions this Com-
ment posits is whether this sole form of intimacy-the physical union
of two bodies-constitutes Lawrence's expressive limitation.
While it is unclear what specifically constitutes sexual intimacy for
the Lawrence majority, their use of the term is not accidental. "Sexual
conduct," as a stand-alone concept, is never present in the opinion;
rather, it is always qualified with the term "intimate."45 The Court's
treatment of protected intimate conduct is informed by precedent-a
series of decisions which have, over time, granted increasing constitu-
tional protection to intimate sexual matters. Griswold v. Connecticut,
heavily relied on by the Lawrence Court, placed significant emphasis
on the marital relationship and the conduct occurring therein. This
limitation in Griswold, which was both spatial and expressive, was
eroded by subsequent rulings in Eisenstadt v. Baird7 and Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International, which extended protection to sexual ex-
pression and conduct occurring outside the marital framework. Both
decisions placed strong emphasis on the privacy rights of the individ-
ual, as opposed to that of the collective marital unit. The infamous
"mystery-of-life" passage contained in Planned Parenthood v. Casey49 ap-
pears, on its face, to introduce a more expansive understanding of in-
timate sexual conduct, by empowering the individual to determine
what constitutes intimate conduct for herself. However, while Law-
rence relied heavily on Casey,5' its understanding of intimate conduct
does not appear as liberating. The Lawrence Court does caution
against having the judiciary set rigid boundaries concerning the
meaning of relationships.5' However, by claiming that" [w] hen sexu-
44 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63 (describing what Houston Police officers witnessed upon
entering Lawrence's home). There may have been other expressions of intimacy which were
not observed, such as intimate conversation or other forms of activity not necessarily involving
physical contact.
See, e.g., id. at 576 (referring to the "right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate,
consensual conduct"); id. at 567 (considering "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in inti-
mate conduct with another person").
46 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a state prohibition on the dispensing
or use of birth control devices to or by married couples).
47 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (holding, in part, that there was no rational reason for the dif-
ferent treatment of married and unmarried people for the purposes of criminalizing distribu-
tion of contraceptives).
48 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a New York statute which regulated the sales, advertise-
ments, and displays of contraceptives).
49 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."). But see Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "mystery-of-life" passage in Casey does
nothing to expand post-Roejurisprudence).
50 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (justifying the overruling of Bowers in part because Casey "cast
[the Bowers] holding into.., doubt").51 Id. at 567 ("This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a
court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries .. ").
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ality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person,
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring," the majority impliedly suggested not only that such con-
duct involves two individuals engaged in an "overt" expression, but
that there is a relationship which exists beyond the sex act 
itself.5 2
Such a narrow understanding of intimate sexual conduct not only ig-
nores the experience of sexuality implicit in contemporary western
culture,53 but also may unduly restrict the opinion's holding beyond
the intention of its authors.
2. Spatial Limitations
The spatial limitation present in Lawrence is less equivocal than the
expressive limitation. In light of the underlying facts, as well as the
petition for certiorari,55 the opinion can be narrowly interpreted as
extending protection only to activities which occur within the four
walls of one's home. 6 However, such a restrictive understanding of
the spatial bounds to which sexual privacy extends was not ultimately
adopted by the Court. Throughout the opinion, the Court repeat-
edly referred to the sanctity of the home and its accompanying ex-
pectation of privacy.57 Notwithstanding such continued reference to
this "most private of places," the Court acknowledged that privacy
outside of residential confines deserves protection as well. 5  As one of
the Court's earliest "privacy" cases, Griswold placed special emphasis
on the sanctity of the marital bedroom as a space that should remain
52 Id. The term "overt" assumes an obviousness and intentionality in the sexual act, as op-
posed to understanding sexuality as a subtext that may exist in non-physical acts. See infra notes
79-83 and accompanying text (discussing Michel Foucault's views of sexuality as existing out-
side of the sexual act, as a construct that permeates non-physical, everyday activities).
53 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, INTRODUCTION] (suggesting
that sexuality, as a product of modem civilization, is experienced in a wide range of activities
both physical and non-physical, intentional and unintentional); see also infta notes 79-83 and
accompanying text (surveying briefly Foucault's theories on sexuality and modernity).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code." (quoting Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 850)); see id. at 579 (expressing
an intent to "define the liberty of all" and invoke the principles of the Constitution in a "search
for greater freedom").
55 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that the petition for certiorari focused
narrowly on "conduct").
56 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (observing that the petitioners astutely pre-
sented the Court with the narrow issue concerning "adult consensual sexual intimacy" in "the
home").
57 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("The laws involved in Bowen .... touch[] upon the most
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home....
[A] dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes... ").
58 See id. at 562 ("Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.").
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free from unwarranted state intrusion.59 As with understandings of
protected conduct, Eisenstadt and Carey extended this conception of
the private sphere beyond the walls of a particular room. 60 The pri-
vacy afforded to intimate sexual conduct no longer remained at-
tached to the marital bedroom, or even the bedroom for that matter.
The Lawrence Court embraced this more expansive view of protected
space at the outset of the opinion by stating that "there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State
should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial
bounds."6' The challenge for the courts lies in teasing out the distinc-
tions between those spaces outside the "home" where intimate sexual
conduct is protected, and the spatial limitation is posed by spheres
that are sufficiently public to warrant state intrusion.
Both spatial and expressive limitations are apparent in Lawrence.
Yet, the precise boundaries of those limits are uncertain. Strict reli-
ance on the underlying facts of Lawrence would result in an overly nar-
row application of the opinion, protecting only a certain type of sex-
ual conduct ("intimate") occurring within a particular private sphere
(the "home"). Yet, given the Court's language, and the general spirit
of the opinion, it seems unlikely that such an interpretation was in-
tended.6  Undoubtedly, the limiting dimensions within the opinion
must be upheld, protecting the implicated liberty interest from the
type of over-interpretation critics predicted.6 s However, these limita-
tions must be infused with a contemporary understanding of certain
sexual and spatial realities. This will give the opinion proper appli-
cability in a wide range of future cases, as well as demonstrate why
prior cases such as Barnes were incorrectly decided.
II. THE CASE FOR (RE) DEFINING SEXUAL EXPRESSION
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc." is a prime example of a case that could
be subject to a Lawrence-type analysis had it come before the Court
today, despite that fact that it originally arose under an entirely dif-
59 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 ("Would we allow the police to search
the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The
very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.").
60 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (observing that Eisenstadi and Carey ex-
panded the Court's privacy jurisprudence by not relying upon Grisw0/d's limited vision of mari-
tal privacy).
61 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
62 See supra note 37 (noting that the petitioners' narrowing of the issue was strategic, and not
necessarily representative of the Court's view); see also supra notes 14, 54 and accompanying text
(suggesting that an overly narrow reading of the petition for certiorari belies the Lawrence
Court's broader language and tenor concerning liberty).
See supra note 31 (discussing the "doomsday predictions" of Lawrence's critics).
501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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ferent constitutional doctrine. When the State of Indiana attempted
to enforce a prohibition against completely nude dancing at the Kitty
Kat Lounge, the petitioners sought an injunction, claiming a viola-
tion of their rights guaranteed by the First Amendment." The Court,
in a holding that has since been much criticized,66 found that nude
dancing was afforded protection within the "outer perimeters" of the
First Amendment, though "only marginally so. 't7 After placing such
expressive conduct in the outer realm of protection afforded by the
First Amendment, the Court readily accepted the state's two main in-
terests as sufficient justification for the regulation: protecting order
and protecting morality."s That nude dancing receives some protec-
tion under the First Amendment, however marginal, seems to be the
legacy of Barnes rather than its ultimate outcome.
It is worthwhile to note that the Court in Barnes referred to Bowers
v. Hardwick in order to validate the State's asserted interest in moral-
ity,7° which makes analysis under Lawrence all-the-more compelling."'
This section of the Comment will use the facts present in Barnes to
demonstrate how a proper application of Lawrence, one adopting a
nuanced conception of the modem experience of sexuality and an
expansive understanding of "intimate sexual conduct," can affect
various cases outside of Lawrence's original framework. Specifically,
use of Barnes can demonstrate how certain cases dealing with regula-
tions of sexual expression, previously argued on First Amendment
65 Id. at 563-64. The petitioners included the owners of the Kitty Kat Lounge as well as sev-
eral dancers. The petitioners had been prosecuted for violating the state's public indecency
statute.
As a matter of First Amendment jurisprudence, Barnes has been given significant critical
treatment. See, e.g., Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 595 (Pa. 2002) (citing the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's prior unanimous adoption of the standard set forth in Justice White's
dissent in Barnes, and holding that Erie's prohibition was unconstitutionally overbroad). This
Comment is not intended to suggest that Barnes should be explicitly overruled on First
Amendment grounds, but rather that the facts present in the case, after Lawrence, would lend
themselves to a successful claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
67 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66.
68 See id. at 569 ("[T]he public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest
in protecting order and morality.").
See Baker, supra note 18, at 23 ("[P]erhaps the Court's one solid finding-that nonverbal
expressive conduct falls within the First Amendment's reach-will be the lasting legacy in the
case .... ").
70 See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569 ("The law, however, is constantly based on notions of moral-
ity .... " (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986))).
71 Reliance on Bowers calls future application of Barnes into question, insofar as Lawrence
overturned Bowers, claiming that "[ o ] ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (citing Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
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grounds, may be more effectively argued when understood as sexual
conduct regulations for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 2
In a fitting twist of irony, Justice Scalia, concurring in Barnes, lent
support to the above assertion, as he vigorously claimed that the nude
dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge was not expression, but rather con-
duct, and therefore not subject to First Amendment protection or
analysis.73 If definable as sexual conduct, it appears that the activity at
issue in Barnes would properly be subject to a due process challenge
after Lawrence. In order for such a challenge to succeed, however, it
must first be determined how live nude performances at the Kitty Kat
Lounge can be understood as adult, consensual, intimate sexual con-
duct. Put another way, what are the problems posed by Lawrence's
expressive and spatial limitations? Asking this question requires an
understanding of contemporary sexuality in its myriad forms. Spe-
cifically, in determining what type of activity constitutes "intimate
sexual conduct" one needs to ask further questions: How is sexuality
currently experienced in contemporary western society? How has sexu-
ality-not only as a practice but also as a discourse-been produced
or constructed? In what ways do we as sexual subjects and objects ul-
timately produce and/or derive pleasure? And, what is at stake in
engaging in non-traditional or deviant sex acts? Looking to post-
modem, psychoanalytic, feminist, and even economic theory helps to
answer some of these difficult inquiries.
Broadly defining sexual conduct via postmodern and feminist
theory is a cumbersome project that would undoubtedly span vol-
umes. However the task becomes considerably more manageable
when examining Barnes as just one example of how such theory can
be employed in a due process analysis.15 Insofar as Barnes involved
nude dancers, as well as the spectators engaged in watching them, the
act of looking/being looked at needs to be understood as a form of
See Baker, supra note 18, at 23 (arguing that the Court should consider prohibitions on
sodomy as regulation of expression under First Amendment doctrines). This Comment di-
verges from Professor Baker's analysis by suggesting that, after Lawrence, regulations of expres-
sion may be considered on due process grounds).
73 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he challenged regulation must be up-
held... because, as a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expres-
sion, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all."). However, Justice White argued,
perhaps most aptly, that nude dancing contains both conduct and expressive elements. See id. at
592 (White,J, dissenting).
74 The definitions of "adult" and "consensual" are not at issue in Barnes, as minors were
banned from the premises of the Kitty Kat Lounge and it can be readily assumed that dancers
and patrons were present under their own will. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 ("In such places ...
minors are excluded and there are no nonconsenting viewers.").
75 Different cases with different fact patterns would pose significantly different questions.
This Comment uses Barnes as an example of just one way in which conceptions of sexual con-
duct can be understood and employed in a due process analysis.
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sexual conduct. In other words, "voyeurism"7 6 and "exhibitionism 77
need to be (re)defined as sex acts in and of themselves, such that
they could be subject to protection under Lawrence.78
Assuming that voyeurism and exhibitionism are ostensibly non-
physical activities (at least when compared with more traditional
forms of sexual conduct, such as intercourse), ajustification must be
found for "reading" sexuality into such passive acts. The great ob-
server of contemporary sexuality, Michel Foucault, opened the door
for exploring the sexuality inherent in non-physical actions such as
"looking" or being "looked at."79 Sexuality, as observed by Foucault,
exists outside of the sexual act, and should be understood as an ex-
perience, a construct, and a discourse that permeates non-physical,
everyday activities.80 Historical repression of the sex act in western
culture, Foucault argues, led to its inevitable expression in other
"non-act" based formulations."' As such, sex "spreads over the surface
of things and bodies," creating a great "surface network" of sexuali-
ties. 2 In what has been cited as Foucault's "most visionary" moment,
he noted that this historical repression of the sex act has led to an era
of "multiplication" and "dispersion" of sexualities; and, most impor-
tant for our analysis, a culture ripe with "sexual heterogeneities" and
a proliferation of multiple "categories of pleasure" independent of
the physical sex act.8s
76 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 42, at 818 (defining voyeur as "[o]ne who habitually
seeks sexual stimulation by visual means"); see also LINDA WILLIAMS, HARD CORE: POWER,
PLEASURE, AND THE "FRENZY OF THE VISIBLE," at X (1989) (referring to the act of watching por-
nography as "literal voyeurism").
77 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 42, at 264 (defining exhibitionism as "the act or prac-
tice of behaving [sexually] so as to attract attention to oneself").
78 It is assumed throughout this analysis that acts of voyeurism and exhibitionism involve
mutually consenting adults. Additionally, it will be assumed that any asserted state interest is
purely morality-based.
79 For Foucault's essay on the history of sexuality, see generally FOUCAULT, INTRODUCTION,
supra note 53; MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE CARE OF THE SELF (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, SELF]; MICHEL FOUCAULT,
THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USE OF PLEASURE (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990)
(1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, PLEASURE].
so According to Foucault, there is nothing "natural" about the sexual "act" itself. Rather, the
act is a construct, a product of societal power relations. See generally FOUCAULT, INTRODUCTION,
supra note 53.
81 Sexuality was placed into discourse via historical repression and stigmatization of the act.
When historically discouraged from engaging in sex acts, sexuality often became manifest in
non-physical phenomenon. See id. at 17-23.
82 Id. at 72; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND
THE LAW 587-88 (2d ed. 2004) (providing a general summary of Foucault's theories on sexual-
ity).
93 ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 82, at 587-89 (citing FOUCAULT, INTRODUCTION, supra
note 53, at 90-106).
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When deciphering the meaning of sexual conduct as present in
Lawrence, it is essential to look at Foucault and other postmodern
theorists who challenge paradigmatic assumptions concerning sexual-
ity and gender.84 By exposing sexuality as a construct which perme-
ates all things,"5 rather than as a natural phenomenon, Foucault ex-
pands on the solely act-based conception of sexuality implicit in
Lawrence. Most importantly, Foucault challenges the assumption that
sexuality is always reducible to intercourse."'
This insight has led contemporary theorists to expand on the
foundations established by Foucault. Specifically, feminist film theo-
rists, such as Laura Mulvey and Linda Williams, have begun to under-
stand the act of viewing itself as a sexualized act. This paves the way
for a conceptualization of sexuality present in non-physical acts de-
serving of constitutional protection.
A. The Act of Looking
Having made a case for reading sexuality into non-physical ac-
tions, it must be determined whether the actions involved in Barnes
are sex acts in and of themselves. Specifically, can the interaction be-
tween voyeurism ("looking") and exhibitionism ("being looked at")
be considered a form of sexual conduct? Having moved beyond the
need to establish the existence of a physical sexual act, it is now "no
longer a question of saying what was done.., and how it was done;
but of reconstructing, in and around the act, ... the obsessions that
accompanied it, the images, desires, modulations, and quality of the
pleasure that animated it.'87 Psychoanalysis is a powerful tool for un-
covering the mechanics behind the act of "looking" and for describ-
ing "patterns of fascination.., at work within the individual sub-
ject." Such analysis unlocks the modes in which subjects internalize
the elements viewed and how pleasure is derived from looking or be-
ing looked at.89
84 See id. at 584 (analyzing Foucault's social constructionist philosophy). See generally SARA
SALIH, JUDITH BUTLER (2002) (discussing the performative and constructed nature of sex dis-
tinctions).
See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 82, at 587 (discussing the roots of sexuality notions,
such as religion and educational systems). Foucault also observed that the traditional ties of the
family were being taken over by "ties of pleasure and corporality." Id. at 589.86 See id. at 559 (discussing Foucault's belief that all sexuality is "constructed, the conven-
tional no less than the deviant").
87 WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 35 (citing FOUCAULT, INTRODUcTION, supra note 53, at 63).
88 LAURA MULVEY, VISUAL AND OTHER PLEASURES 14 (1989) [hereinafter MULVEY, VISUAL].
Much of the following analysis relies heavily on feminist film theory; however, the filmic
components of the cited works are not within the subject matter of this Comment. While Mul-
vey and Williams go further to discuss how the apparatus of cinema produces visual pleasure
and a gendered subjectivity, this Comment is primarily interested in how the very act of "look-
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It is contended that "[t] here are circumstances in which looking
itself is a source of pleasure, just as... there is pleasure in being
looked at."9° Sigmund Freud referred to this phenomenon as scopo-
philia, the "basic human sexual drive to look at other human beings
in such a way that the process of looking arouses sexual stimulation
and objectifies the person looked at."91 Freud argues that pleasure
derived from the act of looking stems from this "fetishization" of the
human body.92 Applying this theory to Barnes, the audience at the
Kitty Kat Lounge derived pleasure from the act of watching the danc-
ers on stage by "fetishizing" their bodies. While subconscious and
non-physical, such "semiotics of fetishism," according to some theo-
rists, conceptualize a true "sexual reality.
9 3
It is ultimately through the sexually charged "gaze"94 of the specta-
tor that the process of "looking" is consummated as sexualized con-
duct.95 The dominating gaze (in Barnes the dominating gaze is pre-
sumably that of the male audience member) carries with it a
96tremendous amount of sexual power. This gaze, as the manifesta-
tion of the viewer's scopophilic instinct, may be understood as sexual,
insofar as "pleasure in his own sexual organ" transfers to the "pleas-
ure in watching other people" engaged in erotic activity. Thus, the
ing" itself produces pleasure, ignoring the enhancement afforded by cinematic conventions.
For a case similar to Barnes, dealing with the regulation of pornographic movies, see Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (holding that there are legitimate state interests in
regulating pornography). Analysis into potential due process challenges to the underlying facts
in Paris would require deeper inquiry into the ways the act of viewing cinema can be construed
as sexual conduct.
90 MULVEY, VISUAL, supra note 88, at 16.
91 ANN BROOKS, POSTFEMINISMS 165 (1997) (discussing Lacanian and Freudian psychoanaly-
sis). Freud isolated scopophilia as "one of the component instincts of sexuality which exist as
drives quite independently of the erotogenic zones." MULVEY, VISUAL, supra note 88, at 16.
92 See generally LAURA MULVEY, FETISHISM AND CURIOSITY (1996) (expanding on Freud's Three
Essays on Sexuality by describing the process through which man fetishizes the female body and
the subsequent derivation of pleasure). According to Freud, the process of fetishization is an
unconscious one, stemming from the male castration complex. Id. at 5.
93 Id. at 2; see alsoJACQUELINE ROSE, SEXUALITY IN THE FIELD OF VISION 227 (1986) ("[Slex-
uality lies... in the subjectivity of the viewer, in the relationship between what is looked at and
the developing sexual knowledge.... .").
94 Brooks understands the "gaze" as the manifestation of one's scopophilic instinct, "taking
other people as objects [and] subjecting them to a controlling and curious gaze." BROOKS, su-
pra note 91, at 165-66 (citing MULVEY, VISUAL, supra note 88, at 160).
95 The concept of the "gaze" was developed to examine subjectivity in film and is discussed
extensively in cultural theory texts. However, barring any discussion of cinematic conventions,
the "gaze" (usually assumed to be that of the male viewer) can be used to examine subjectivity
in live performances as well. See generally MARY ANN DOANE, FEMMES FATALES: FEMINISM, FILM
THEORY, PSYCHOANALYSIS (1991) (discussing the gaze in analyzing filmic subjectivity); MULVEY,
VISUAL, supra note 88 (same); WILLIAMS, supra note 76 (same).
96 See BROOKS, supra note 91, at 85 (analyzing the nature of "the dominating male gaze, car-
rying with it, social, political, economic and sexual power").
97 Id. at 165.
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sexuality implicit in traditional physical sexual acts is not lost when
one engages in voyeuristic or exhibitionistic activity, it is rather trans-
ferred; the stimulation experienced is a "visceral appeal to the body"
that comes from the very act of viewing itself.98 While there is no ac-
tual physical contact of bodies, this transfer of pleasure occurs spe-
cifically because the distance between the subject and the "object" al-
lows the viewer to assume a voyeuristic or fetishistic sexualized
position.9
According to these theories of the "gaze," patrons and performers
at the Kitty Kat Lounge were engaged in a two-step process through
which they experienced the transfer of sexual pleasure described
above: they derived sexual pleasure from the exercise of their scopo-
philic instincts, while simultaneously deriving pleasure from their
identification with the dancers on stage.100 The former pleasure is
one of objectification, inasmuch as those watching the nude dancers
derived sexual satisfaction by objectifying them-taking them as "ob-
jects [and] subjecting them to a controlling and curious gaze. ' '
This act of "viewing"/"being viewed" mimics the dynamics present in
more traditional, physical forms of sexual conduct, and may be seen
as a non-physical analog to traditional intercourse. The active proc-
ess of looking (objectifying) ,'0 coupled with the passive process of be-
ing looked at (being objectified) mirrors natural oppositions such as
dominant/submissive and penetrator/penetrated. 1b As participants
in a voyeuristic exchange, this was precisely the sexual dynamic which
occurred every night among those at the Kitty Kat Lounge; a type of
non-physical, visual intercourse. 4
98 WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 5.
See BROOKs, supra note 91, at 171 (surveying various theories on why "distance" is sexually
satisfying); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 245 ("[V]oyeurism and fantasy safely distance the
characters from actual physical contact.").
100 See MULVEY, VISUAL, supra note 88, at 18 (setting out two aspects of pleasurable structures
of looking, the first "scopophilic ... [; t] he second... comes from identification with the image
seen").
101 Id. at 16. The difference between heterosexuals and homosexuals, for the purpose of ob-
jectification, is that the homosexual "'outlet' is characterized by the choice of an object of the
same sex as oneself." GuY HOCQUENGHEM, HOMOSEXUAL DESIRE 100 (Daniella Dangoor trans.,
1978).
102 See MULVEY, VISUAL, supra note 88, at 18-19 (discussing "active scopophilia").
103 See FOUcAULT, PLEASURE, supra note 79, at 46-47 ("[T] he great caesura between male and
female sexuality ... were thought of as an activity involving two actors, each having its role and
function-the one who performs the activity and the one on whom it is performed."). Some
theorists have expanded on Freudian and Foucauldian theory by arguing that the process of
artistic expression itself is sexualized, insofar as it mirrors more traditional forms of sexual ex-
pression. See STEVEN C. DUBIN, ARRESTING IMAGES 125 (1992) (quoting Lucy Lippard as saying,
"[I]t is often taken for granted that art-making is directly related to sexuality .... .").
104 At the extreme, voyeurism can become "fixated into a perversion, producing obsessive
voyeurs and Peeping Toms, whose only sexual satisfaction can come from watching, in an active
controlling sense, an objectified other." MULVEY, VISUAL, supra note 88, at 17; see also, Stephen
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The latter mode of deriving sexual pleasure stems from the audi-
ence's identification with the dancers on stage."5 The dancers at the
Kitty Kat Lounge cast the spectator as a "hypothetical partner.''0 6 The
spectator in turn is tantalized by the risk that the show will turn into a
"live sexual exchange," attaining sexual pleasure by allowing the show
to stand in "compensatory substitution for sexual relations them-
selves.' 1 7 By positioning himself as an imaginary partner, the audi-
ence member identifies with the visual on stage, achieving sexual sat-
isfaction purely through the act of viewing. The dancer is a willing
and active participant in this exchange, engaging the subject in a
non-physical form of sexual conduct, (re)defined by a historically
unprecedented "heightened urge to look."08
While not involving the physical union of two bodies, or the exis-
tence of a "bond that is more enduring,"' °9 the nonphysical acts of
looking and being looked at in the Kitty Kat Lounge, may be concep-
tualized as legitimate sexual conduct. Assuming a state cannot assert
a non-morality based counter-interest, such conduct, when engaged
in by consenting adults, should be afforded the full constitutional
protection given to the petitioners in Lawrence."°
B. Implications
It is essential to consider what is at stake in expanding notions of
sexual conduct to include such visual, non-physical activity. As Law-
rence cautioned, the Court should be wary of attempting to define the
meaning of relationships."' Taking this a step further, the courts
should be especially wary of privileging one type of relationship, or
form of expressive conduct, over another, as such unequal treatment
has profound effects on how sexuality is ultimately understood and
Heath, Difference, in THE SEXUAL SUBJECT: A SCREEN READER IN SEXUALITY 77 (1992) (restating
Freud's analysis of the "Peeping Tom"). When such obsessive voyeurism is between noncon-
senting parties, it should obviously not be afforded constitutional protection.
105 See supra MULVEY, VISUAL, note 88, at 18 (describing this late stage of human develop-
ment, when pleasure from "looking" results from personal identification with the viewed ob-
ject).
106 WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 77.
107 Id.
108 See DAVID HOLBROOK, THE PSEUDO-REVOLUTION: A CRITICAL STUDY OF EXTREMIST
"LIBERATION" IN SEX 5 (1972) ("Never before in the history of man have so many people
watched.., the sexual activity of others .... [T] he new development is almost exclusively con-
cerned.., with a 'heightened urge to look.'").
109 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
110 This assumes, of course, that the spatial limitation of Lawrence has not been exceeded.
More consideration to Lawrence's spatial limits will be given below.
III See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (stating, as a general rule, that attempts by the state to define
the meaning of relationships, or to set their boundaries, may have far-reaching consequences
upon the most private human conduct).
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experienced. According to Foucault, one of three axes that consti-
tute "sexuality" as a discourse is "the systems of power that regulate its
practice" via "punitive power and disciplinary practices."'11 2 "Sexual-
ity" has emerged as a concept, in part, because of the establishment
of a set of rules and norms that found support in judicial institu-
tions."3 Therefore, the judiciary should never underestimate the in-
fluence of such decisions as Lawrence and Barnes on discourses of
sexuality.
Under the Bowers regime there was a clear hierarchy of sexual
practices, with varying levels of regulation dependent on the moral
and societal approbation attached to each act." 4 Generally, sexual
conduct within the marital framework for the purpose of procreation
was deemed most worthy of protection from overzealous state regula-
tion, followed by sexual conduct engaged in by unmarried monoga-
mous heterosexuals. Other heterosexual acts involving a deviation
from the heterosexual, two partner paradigm-including homosex-
ual conduct, promiscuous conduct, pornographic acts, and fetishes-
were placed far lower on the totem pole of sexualities.15 While this
virtual caste system of sexual practices has been weakened under Law-
rence, a similar hierarchy will likely emerge if the courts engage in the
practice of discriminating among types of sexual conduct that should
be deemed worthy of protection from morality-based state regulation
under Lawrence. Quite simply, exercising a judicial preference for
one particular form of sexual conduct-one that is traditionally un-
derstood as such-simply reifies pre-Lawrence stereotypes. Whether
or not sex acts are "gay or straight, coupled or in groups, naked or in
underwear, commercial or free, with or without video, should not be
ethical concerns" and should not play a role in judicial determina-
tion.' 6 Unless the courts adopt a similar view, the conduct at issue in
Barnes will likely return to the bottom of the sexual hierarchy, thus
permitting state regulation of a legitimate and ultimately rational
' 7
form of sexual conduct. Such regulation would maintain a hegem-
112 FOUcAULT, PLEAsuRE, supra note 79, at 4.
n1 See id. at 3 (discussing the roots of the term "sexuality," including judicial rules and
norms).
114 See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Note for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in ESKRIDGE
& HUNTER, supra note 82, at 551-60 (discussing socially-constructed sexual hierarchies in
American culture).
t15 See id. at 552-53 (discussing the history of this sexual hierarchy).
116 Id. at 556-57.
17 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992) (arguing that one's sexual prac-
tices are driven by the individual's own cost-benefit and profit-maximizing analysis). Insofar as
the conduct at issue in Barnes--viewing nude performers/performing nude for an audience--
involves no risk of disease, little emotional investment, and few transaction costs (in terms of
searching out a partner), it may be an exceedingly rational form of sexual conduct.
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ony of normative sexualities which the Lawrence decision, at least in
spirit, purports to shun.
III. (RE) DEFINING THE HOME '
Under Lawrence, classifying the act in question as intimate sexual
conduct only completes half of the analysis. While the above sections
have argued that the conduct in Barnes is not outside the expressive
limitation of Lawrence, the opinion's spatial limitations must be con-
sidered as well. Specifically, does the conduct in question occur
within a sufficiently private sphere to render government regulation
impermissible? The facts of Lawrence appear to suggest that only sex-
ual conduct within the home receives constitutional protection. "
However, as noted previously, the Court in Lawrence supported the
notion that freedom may exist beyond these "spatial bounds."12 °
As with notions of sexual conduct, the courts need to employ a re-
ality-based conception of the distinctions between public and private
spheres when dealing with questions posed by Lawrence's spatial limi-
tations. The key difference between this distinction and various un-
derstandings of sexual conduct is that the private/public opposition
is ajudicial construction, created by the courts to justify varying levels
of protection.1 2 1 Foucault observed that notions of public and private
are historical and social constructions which, although considered in-
violable oppositions, are subject to continued contention. 22 As such,
the privacy of the "home" may be created in a variety of spaces out-
side of the traditional residential unit for numerous reasons. Certain
sexual practices traditionally considered deviant have never found a
11 Detailed analysis of private/public distinctions drawn by the Court would warrant several
articles in itself, and is outside the scope of this Comment. This section of the Comment is
simply intended to highlight the problems posed by Lawrence's spatial limitation. As this Com-
ment is primarily concerned with advocating for an expansive judicial conception of sexual
conduct, this section is simply intended to highlight the similar problems posed by Lawrence's
spatial limitations. Considerably more space and time would be needed to appropriately ad-
dress the fact-specific intricacies of this concern.
11 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (considering "[w]hether petitioner's
criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home" violate due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
120 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing "the more expansive view of pro-
tected space" embraced in Lawrence).
1 The Court consistently creates distinctions between public and private spheres in a variety
of contexts. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (distinguish-
ing between public and non-public forums for First Amendment purposes); Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (determining whether a
parade was a private or public action); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (deter-
mining who is a public figure for defamation purposes); cf Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Div., Nat'l
Lead Co., 218 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1955) (defining "public use" in the context of patent litigation).
122 See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces, DIACRITICS, Spring 1986, at 22-27 (discussing
notions of the interconnectedness of "space" as the "great obsession" of the modern era).
Apr. 20051
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
place in the home, and instead have sought expression in more pub-
lic spheres.12  Moreover, the home has often been recognized as a
space dominated by ideologies of patriarchy, where non-majoritarian
sexual practices are unable to find expression and flourish.
Putting these admittedly more theoretical qualms aside, the courts
cannot deny that the home is no longer easily classifiable as a purely
private space. 25 The privacy of the home can be easily replicated in a
variety of contexts, from hotel rooms for the constantly traveling
business person, to the viewing booths inside the Kitty Kat Lounge.
While the majority in Barnes considered the Kitty Kat Lounge to be a
place of "public accommodation," it is not clear how that conclusion
was reached. 26 As the respondents in the case pointed out, minors
were barred from entry, as were non-adults. While not a purely pri-
vate space, it may be a gross oversimplification to refer to the Kitty
Kat Lounge as a place of public accommodation.
27
Whether the courts will be willing to extend Fourteenth Amend-
ment protection to sexual conduct occurring outside the home will
likely be determined on a case-by-case basis. The private/public dis-
tinction is fact specific and ostensibly constructed by the courts.
Therefore, how literally any adjudicative body adheres to the spatial
limitations set forth in Lawrence will depend on the particulars of each
case. While the sexual conduct present in Lawrence is of the variety
traditionally experienced in the confines of one's own bedroom, the
same is not so for the conduct at issue in Barnes, which may justify a
more liberal interpretation of Lawrence's spatial limitations. The
courts should take this, as well as the foregoing analysis, into account
should they encounter a case like Barnes in the future.
CONCLUSION
If limited to its underlying facts, the Lawrence opinion would have
a narrower application than its authors had originally intended. If
read as protecting only a certain form of intimate sexual conduct
within the confines of the home, rather than securing rights for those
123 See HOCQUENGHEM, supra note 101 (tracing the history of homosexuality and the devel-
opment of certain sexual practices outside of the home).
124 See generally SPACE, GENDER, KNOWLEDGE: FEMINIST READINGS 160-67 (Linda McDowell &
Joan P. Sharp eds., 1997) (mapping the gender implications of spaces).
125 See generally MARGARET MORSE, An Ontology of Everyday Distraction: The Freeway, the Mall, and
Television, in VIRTUALITIES 99-124 (1998) (discussing the blurring of public/private distinctions
in "everyday" modem life).
16 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (emphasizing the public nature
of the Kitty Kat Lounge).
127 See id. at 595-96 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that there is little difference between the
state's interest in prohibiting nude dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge and an interest in prohibit-
ing such activity in the home).
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on the margins, the decision could be understood as simply preserv-
ing the pre-Lawrence sexual status quo. However, if the court employs
a contemporary understanding of sexual and social realities when
construing the future reach of Lawrence, the ultimate thrust of the
decision will be far more liberating.
If such an expansive view of Lawrence's expressive and spatial limi-
tations is adopted by the courts, as this Comment argues it should be,
the implications could be quite significant for other areas of constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Specifically, if courts look to the experience of
sexuality in all its manifold forms, sexual expression cases which tra-
ditionally originated under First Amendment doctrine may now be
more effectively argued as conduct cases under the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendments. This Comment used just one example, that of
Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., to demonstrate how such an analysis could
play itself out. Ultimately, the Court in Barnes accepted flimsy state
interests to justify the regulation of nude dancing. However, after
Lawrence, when applying an expansive and contemporary understand-
ing of sexual conduct, the asserted interest in morality would no
longer pass muster. Thus, the only remaining question would be as
to the sufficiency of the state interest in "protecting order.' 2 9 Unless
the state could assert a legitimate concern that nude dancing would
disturb public order, such sexual conduct should not be prohibited.
Rather, courts should protect sexual conduct in its manifold
forms, and should not privilege (for the purposes of constitutional
protection) sexual conduct traditionally considered more acceptable
and well understood-most notably that which is "intimate" and oc-
curring in the home. Specifically, the courts need to approach future
interpretation of Lawrence with a broad conception of sexual conduct
and employ a methodology, in future decisions, which accounts for
contemporary sexual realities. If, in their early interpretations of
Lawrence, the courts adopt understandings of sexuality that are truly
encompassing and reflect the modern experience of sexuality, the
opinion will more fully live up to its ultimate promise of ensuring that
"persons in every generation can invoke [the Constitution's] princi-
ples in their own search for greater freedom."'3 °
128 Id. at 569 (accepting state interests in protecting order and morality).
12 Id.
130 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
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